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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE "TRANSITORY"
CAUSE OF ACTION t
Brainerd Currie *
The author,using as his startingpoint two statements of the Supreme
Court in a recent conflict-of-laws case, develops a theory which may
be the unexpressed basis of decisions purportedly grounded on the
full-faith-and-credit clause. He searches for a consistent rationale
which will clarify a state's obligation to provide a forum for causes
of action of foreign origin and will also define the limits within
which the state may refuse to entertain the action because of local
court-administrationpolicy.

IN

I.

STATEMENT

Fetter1

Hughes v.
the Supreme Court confronted the legal
profession with a seeming paradox. Reversing the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, 2 the Court held that a state may not, consistently with the full-faith-and-credit clause,' refuse to entertain an action for wrongful death predicated upon the laws of a
sister state wherein the injury and death occurred. At the same
time, in a rather cryptic footnote, the Court reserved the possibility that a state in the position of Wisconsin, having entertained the action for wrongful death, might constitutionally apply
its own law rather than that of the state of injury "to measure
the substantive rights involved." 4 To say the least, this decision seems to require only limited and partial, rather than full,
faith and credit. Wisconsin must entertain the action because
the Constitution requires recognition of the public acts of the
state of injury- specifically, the wrongful-death statute of Illinois - by which the right of action is created. But the obligation
t This is the first installment of a two-part article.
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. LL.B., Mercer Univ., 1935,
A.B. 1937, LL.M., Columbia, 1941, J.S.D. 1955.
1341 U.S. 6og (ig5i).
2

Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35,

42

N.W.2d 452 (195o).

3 U.S. CousT. art. IV, § i.
4 341 U.S. at 612 n.io.
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to recognize the Illinois statute and the rights stemming from
it is discharged by Wisconsin's mere acceptance of the case;
thereafter Wisconsin may apply its own law rather than that of
Illinois as the rule of decision.
To state the matter somewhat more strongly, the decision
apparently endorsed two inconsistent philosophies of the conflict
of laws. The language of the opinion proper is a dismaying restatement of the obligatio theory,5 or territorialist theory of vested
rights, ominously suggesting restoration of that theory to the constitutional status which it had enjoyed for a brief and unfortunate period; I Wisconsin's asserted policy was found in conflict
with "the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each
state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the
statutes of sister states .... ,,7 At the same time, the Court's
footnote reaffirmed the very analysis which had dethroned the
obligatio theory and confirmed the freedom of the forum state to
apply its own law and policy whenever it has a legitimate interest
in so doing: 8
The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having entertained
appellant's lawsuit, chose to apply its own instead of Illinois'
statute to measure the substantive rights involved. This distinguishes the present case from those where we have said that
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its
own statutes, lawfully enacted." 9
The piquancy of the paradox is heightened if Hughes v. Fetter
is read, as it must be read, against the background of such cases
as Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George.10 There the Court
held that the full-faith-and-credit clause did not prevent the
' See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473

194 U.S.

120,

(1912);

Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R.,

126 (19o4).

o See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(934); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (igiS); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234
U.S. 542 (94); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 9 (2958).
7341 U.S. at 612.
sSee Currie, supra note 6.
0341 U.S. at 612 n.io.
See also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 23 U.S.
20 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
55 (go09).
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Georgia courts from entertaining an action under the Alabama
Employers' Liability Act although the same public act which
created the right stipulated that actions to enforce it "must be
brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of
Alabama, and not elsewhere." " Quite possibly the meaning of
Hughes v. Fetter was that Georgia in such a case not only may
but must entertain such an action - because the Constitution requires full faith and credit to the public acts (or to selected portions of the public acts) of Alabama. Moreover, the footnote in
Hughes v. Fetter seems inconsistent with a dictum in George:
"The courts of the sister State trying the case would be bound to
give full faith and credit to all those substantial provisions of the
statute which inhered in the cause of action or which name conditions on which the right to sue depend [sic]." 12 Indeed, two

years later, in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 3 the Court held
that a United States district court in Pennsylvania, while presumably required by the full-faith-and-credit clause to entertain
an action for wrongful death predicated upon an Alabama statute,
was not required to apply the portion of the Alabama statute which
provided that an action must be brought within two years of the
date of death, but was free to apply Pennsylvania's one-year
statute of limitations.' In short, because of the respect which
the Constitution requires each state to give to the public acts
of sister states, the forum may not refuse to entertain an action
predicated on the laws of another state; but the forum need not,
and probably must not, respect a localizing provision of the
foreign law; and, having entertained the action, the forum need
" Ala. Civ. Code § 611g (19o7). The relevant section of the Employers' Liability
Act is § 391o (now ALA. CoDF tit. 26, § 326 (1940)). See 233 U.S. at 358.
12 233 U.S. at 360. See also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55,
70 (I9o9).
345 U.S. 514 (1953).

4 Formerly, the Alabama wrongful-death statute contained the same qualification, purporting to limit actions to the Alabama courts, which was involved in
the George case. The effect of this qualification was not before the Court in Wells
only because, in deference to the decision in George, the provision had been deleted
in the codification of 1940. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 63 (1940).
Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 415 (1955):
"[T]he forum cannot, by statute or otherwise, refuse to enforce a sister-state
statute giving a transitory cause of action, whether in contract or tort. . . . Indeed,
the forum may permissibly go a step in the other direction and disregard the
venue provisions of an out-of-state statute which would have prevented the forum
from enforcing the right."
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not necessarily apply the foreign law but, at least prima facie,
is entitled to apply its own. What kind of "full faith and credit"
is this?
The decision in Hughes v. Fetter,assessed largely at face value
and without much regard for these complications, was on the
whole well received.' True, there was - as there still is 16 - a
segment of opinion reluctant to take seriously the Supreme
Court's repeated holdings that the due-process and full-faith-andcredit clauses operate to limit the freedom of state courts in deciding questions of conflict of laws even where judgments are
not involved.17 The decision, however, was in accord with prevailing conflict-of-laws doctrine, and the translation of that doctrine to the constitutional level evoked more approval than criticism. The case was an "X-F" case: 18 all of the relevant "contacts," or "connections," of the "occurrence" were associated
with Illinois; '" it was not doubted that, therefore, the law of
Illinois determined the rights of the parties; 2 the "better view,"
disdaining provincialism, strongly favored the uniform interstate
enforcement of rights so determined, and deprecated the invocation of "local public policy" to defeat such enforcement unless
the grounds of policy were very strong.2 1 The majority opinion
and the result being in harmony with this point of view, there
was a tendency simply to ignore the dissonant note sounded in
the margin. 2 Professor Cheatham has resolved the conflict
squarely in favor of the text of the opinion:
15 Some twenty-five legal periodicals published comments either on the Supreme

Court's decision or on the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. For the

complete list, see 9

& 1o INDEX TO LE AL PERIODICALS

(1952,

X955).

"0
See EHRENZWEIG, CoNFcT OF LAWS 12 (1959).
17
See, e.g., 9 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 55 (1952); 1oo U. PA. L. REV. 126 (i95').
1
8 See CHEATHAm, GOODRICH, GRIsworz & REESE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
3 ( 4 th ed. 1957).
10 Cf. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VsD.L. REv. 581, 585,
59o n.29 (1953).
20 RESTATEMENT, CoNrLiCT OF LAWS § 391 (1934).
21 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 12o N.E. 198 (1918); RESTATEMENT,
CoNFLICT orF LAWS § 612 (1934); Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656 (:918); Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local
Fancies, 25 VA. L. Rav. 26 (1938).
22 Some commentators dealt with this difficulty by explaining that the deci-

sion was concerned only with access to courts and not with choice of law. See,
e.g., Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19
U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 345-46 (1952); Comment, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 441, 445-52
(1952); 21 U. CmNc. L. Rlv. I88, 189 (1952).
neither self-explanatory nor self-justifying.

The distinction is important, but is
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The requirement of full faith and credit to "public acts," i.e.,
statutes, means full faith and credit to private rights arising from
them. The principal purpose of public statutes is to create private
rights based on occurrences to which they apply. So, if an occurrence takes place wholly in Illinois, the public acts of Illinois
create rights in the parties to the occurrence. If a suit based on
the Illinois occurrence is brought in Wisconsin, the Constitution
and the federal statute, literally applied, affirmatively direct Wisconsin to give the same credit to the rights under the Illinois law
that the State of Illinois itself would do.2
Another commentator would have gone farther than the Court,
which noted with restraint that "full faith and credit does not
automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state .
,,24
He seriously questioned whether a state should ever be permitted
to close its courts, on grounds of public policy, to a cause of action arising under the laws of a sister state, and called for a "hardand-fast" rule requiring the states to entertain sister-state causes
of action. 5
But there is not, and should not be, any "hard-and-fast" rule
requiring Wisconsin to enforce the Illinois wrongful-death statute
in a situation such as that of Hughes v. Fetter. The Court's footnote is not to be taken lightly. It means exactly what it says. Indeed, all the propositions which have been stated here on the
basis of the Hughes, George, and Wells cases are probably reliable,
paradoxical though they may seem: Wisconsin may not refuse to
entertain the action for wrongful death; the obligation to provide
a forum would be the same even if the law of Illinois purported
to restrict the right of action to Illinois courts; yet Wisconsin is
not required to apply the Illinois wrongful-death statute, but
23 Cheatham, supra note i9,at 585.

Conflict of Laws,
24 341

U.S.

2 Reese,

22

See also Currie, Change of Venue and the

U. CmI. L. REv. 405, 499 n.231 (i955).

at 611.

supra note

22,

at 346. Professor Reese carefully limited his position,

noting that Hughes v. Fetter was not concerned with the impact of full faith and
credit on choice of law and that Wisconsin's refusal to entertain the action was
not based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens nor on its inability to afford the remedy contemplated by the Illinois act. Id. at 343-46. Nevertheless, the
scope of his proposed "hard-and-fast" rule remains unclear: "To be sure, entertainment of a sister state's cause of action . .. does require the forum court to
apply the law of another jurisdiction. But this burden is only one of the costs
of a federal system .....

Id. at 346.
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may apply its own instead. If these propositions are to stand
together, however, it is evident that there must be a reordering of
the constitutional and conflict-of-laws theories on which they
rest; they cannot consistently be derived from the hodge-podge
of territorialism, vested rights, full faith and credit, natural law,
literalism, and governmental-interest analysis which is found in
the cases.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the constitutional obligation of a state to provide a forum for causes of action having
foreign aspects. Necessarily included is the correlative question
of the effect of the Constitution upon the power of a state to provide that its laws shall be enforced only in its own courts. The
problem is part of a broader topic which has been called "access
to courts," 20 the emphasis here being upon the power of a state
to refuse a forum because of considerations of local public policy."
The precise scope of the inquiry will be even narrower, since an
important distinction must be drawn between two different types
of policy considerations, only one of which is directly involved.
The distinction is not one which can be stated in a phrase.
A court confronted with an action having foreign aspects may
(in the context of the problem under discussion) do one of four
things:
(i) It may adjudicate the case in accordance with the law of
the forum;
(2)
It may adjudicate the case in accordance with foreign law;
(3) It may concede that the rights of the parties are governed
by foreign law, but refuse to apply that law in passing upon the
claim or defense because of disagreement with the foreign legal
policy;
26 RESTATEMENT,

CONrLICT or LAWS ch. 12, topic 4 (1934). It should be noted,

however, that "the extent to which the Constitution of the United States may require a State to exercise jurisdiction through its courts is not considered in the
Restatement of this Subject." Id. Scope Note.
27 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
See also id. § 617 ("State
Creating Right cannot Prevent Its Enforcement in Other States").
This discussion will not deal comprehensively with the entire question of the
extent to which the Constitution requires a state to provide a forum for a
cause of action having foreign aspects. In particular, the effect of the equal-protection and privileges-and-immunities clauses must be reserved for separate treatment. The emphasis here is upon the effect, or supposed effect, of the full-faithand-credit clause upon access to courts. Cf. Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 27, 35-36 (z939). The equalprotection and privileges-and-immunities clauses will be discussed only to the
extent that the cases make such discussion necessary.
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(4) It may concede that the foreign law is applicable, and interpose no disagreement with the policy of that law; nevertheless,
it may refuse to entertain the action because of a local policy relating to administration of the courts.
It is the fourth course of action, as distinguished from the third,
which is the focal point of this discussion.
The third course should not be tolerated in our federal system,
with its constitutional restraints upon choice of law. That is to
Isay, it should not be tolerated provided the system for determining when foreign law is controlling is a rational one, constructed
with due regard for the legitimate interests of the states. Under
the traditional system of conflict of laws, which often designates
the controlling law on the basis of "connecting factors" having no
rational relation to state interests, local public policy as employed
in the third course is a necessary escape device, avoiding the application of foreign law where that would produce an unacceptable
result. When, in the context of a constitutional requirement of
full faith and credit, we permit a state to disregard the "applicable"
foreign law merely because it finds that law distasteful, we simply
give testimony that the foreign law was not "applicable," in any
exclusive sense, in the first place. 8 A more rational system would
provide for determining the exclusively applicable law - where
analysis of the governmental interests inthat is possible -by
volved. This has been the system employed, in the main, by the
Supreme Court in the choice-of-law cases arising under the due9
Under such a system,
process and full-faith-and-credit clauses.
a state is justified in applying its own law when the circumstances
are such as to give it a legitimate interest in applying the policy
which that law embodies. It is not justified in applying its own
law when the foreign state has such an interest and the forum
state has none. When this is the situation, the full-faith-andcredit clause, if it means anything, means that the forum state
must defer to the law of the only state having an interest in the
application of its law and policy; there is no room for an inconsistent "local public policy," since it has already been determined
that the forum state has no legitimate interest in the matter. The
28 See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958).
20 Ibid.
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interposition of its own policy notions would be officious inter30
meddling.
The problem raised by the fourth course of action is somewhat
different. The court in which the action is filed may in all sincerity concede that the foreign state has a legitimate interest in
the application of its legal policy, and that the forum state has no
interest in the application of a contradictory policy. Having no
such connection with the transaction or with the parties as to give
it a legitimate basis for an interest, the forum state will not presume
to substitute its own conception of what constitutes sound social
or economic policy in the disposition of the case. Indeed, the
court may heartily agree with the foreign policy; the forum state
may even pursue an identical policy within its own sphere of interest. Yet the forum state also has policies relating to the conduct of its judicial establishment, and these may be called into
play by the assertion of the foreign-based claim. In short, the
forum state, though it is not in position to assert its own ideas of
social and economic policy in opposition to those of the foreign
state, does have a legitimate interest in the application of any
policy relating to the administration of its courts, despite the fact
that such a policy may prevent enforcement of the foreign claim.
When the legitimate interests of two states are in conflict with
respect to social or economic policy, the question of the law which
should be applied involves a political judgment which can properly
be made only by Congress in the exercise of its powers under the
full-faith-and-credit clause. 3 It cannot be resolved by the courts
according to any rational jurisprudence of conflict of laws.32
Either state may apply its own law and policy without violating
any constitutional principle. It may be that the same result follows when the social or economic policy of one state encounters
resistance not on its merits but because of an independent policy
of the forum state relating to judicial administration. On the
30 Under such a system, though not under the present system, which determines
the "applicable" law by reference to "contacts" which are often irrelevant to state
interests, there is justification for Judge Beach's characterization of the defense
of local public policy as "an intolerable affectation of superior virtue." Beach,
supra note 21, at 662.
31

See Coox, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,

28 YA~w L.J. 421 (igig), in TBna LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS ch. IV (1942).

3' See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interest and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. Rav. 9 (1958).
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other hand, it is possible that the policy relating to judicial administration is of a different and inferior order, and that it should
yield to the policy whereby the rights of the parties are concededly
determined. These are the possible solutions of the problem to
which this paper is addressed.
Hughes v. Fetter is hardly typical of the cases which give rise
to the problem, but it provides a good point of departure for the
discussion.

II.

DEATH IN ABSENTIA

How would the result in Hughes v. Fetter have been affected if
the fatal collision had occurred in Ontario instead of in Illinois?
The answer should be: Not at all. The hypothetical case is not
materially different from the actual one. Precisely the same considerations which lead to the conclusion that Wisconsin is required by the Constitution to provide a forum in the actual case
lead to the same conclusion in the hypothetical case. Obviously
this cannot be true if the full-faith-and-credit clause is the basis of
the decision, since that clause makes no reference to the laws of
foreign countries and their political subdivisions. I submit, however, that a different constitutional principle dictated the result
in Hughes v. Fetter, and that full faith and credit has nothing to
do with the case.
This may appear to some to be an impertinent observation, in
view of the fact that the Court squarely grounded its decision on
the full-faith-and-credit clause; but it should not be a surprising
one. We have already seen how the Court, in its tenth footnote,
gave notice that it did not really mean to say that Wisconsin was
required to give full faith and credit to the public acts of Illinois.
There is no escape from Professor Cheatham's proposition that
full faith and credit to the public acts of a state means full faith
and credit to the private rights created by those acts. 3 Since
Wisconsin was not required to determine the rights of the parties
in accordance with the Illinois statute, but was free to apply its
own law, it is clear that the full-faith-and-credit clause was not
operating as it operated, for example, in Bradford Elec. Light Co.
v. Clapper3 4 and Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
33 See
34 286

pp. 39-40 supra.
U.S. 145 (1932).
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Wolfe,3 5 in which application of the law of the forum was denounced by the Court. Something other than the command of
full faith and credit to the public acts of sister states required Wisconsin to entertain the action.
Hughes v. Fetter has been regarded as a case in which all the
factors, or "contacts," relevant to choice of the appropriately applicable law were associated with Illinois. 6 In terms of the traditional system of conflict of laws this is an accurate appraisal;
the only relevant circumstance, according to that system, is that
the fatal injury occurred in Illinois. 7 In terms of an analysis of
the interests of the respective states, however, the converse is
true: given the governmental policies which may reasonably be
inferred from a wrongful-death statute, and the relationship of
the parties and events to the respective states, it is abundantly
clear that Wisconsin was, or should have been, concerned with the
outcome, and that Illinois had little or no basis for an interest in
the matter.
Harold Hughes, the young man who was killed, was a resident
of Wisconsin. So was his father, who, as administrator, was
plaintiff in the action. So was the defendant, Glenn Fetter, who
was the driver of the car in which Hughes was a passenger. The
corporate defendant, which had issued a policy of casualty insurance covering the Fetter car, was a Wisconsin corporation.
Hughes was survived by his father and stepmother, both of Wisconsin, and by a brother who was a resident of Illinois."8 These
human facts are treated as completely irrelevant by the traditional
system of conflict of laws. They are highly significant, however, in
any discussion of the legitimate scope of a state's governmental
concern, and they ought to have significance in any system of conflict of laws which is not totally divorced from reality.
The governmental policy embodied in a wrongful-death statute
is reasonably clear. Lord Campbell's Act, 9 which provided the
model for the Wisconsin and Illinois statutes, was entitled "An
Act for compensating the Families of Persons killed by Acci35 331

U.S. 586 (1947).

"nSee Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAMN.L. REv. 581
(1953) ; cf. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1952).
"RESTATEMENT, CoNmLicr oF LAWS § 391 (1934).
's Record, pp. 4-6, 13, 20, 26; Brief for Appellee, p. 3.
39 9 & io Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
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dents." The preamble, after reciting the absence of a remedy at
common law, declared that "it is oftentimes right and expedient
that the Wrongdoer in such Case should be answerable in Damages
for the Injury so caused by him . .

.

...
Section II provided that

"the Jury may give such Damages as they may think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties . . .
for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought . .

. ."

As the

Minnesota court said simply, "The object of the statute was to
remedy the harshness of the common law, and in some degree
compensate those dependent upon the person killed." 40 Under
the Illinois statute no action can be maintained unless there is a
qualified beneficiary and a showing of pecuniary loss, 41 and the

same is true under the Wisconsin statute.4 2 In its domestic context, such a statute represents a choice between conflicting interests
of individuals: as between members of the community who have
suffered because of a death and the member whose fault was the
cause, the loss is to be borne by the latter.
The question then becomes: How should the statute be applied
to cases which are not wholly domestic in order to effectuate the
community's policy? Rather clearly, its benefits should be made
available whenever those who are the objects of its protection are
members of the community-i.e., residents or domiciliaries of
the state. In one sense, perhaps, it is the dependent relatives who
are the object of the state's concern. Such beneficiaries, however,
may be numerous and scattered, so that to administer the statute
on the basis of the residence of each of them would be a cumbersome business, to say the least. Understandably, then, a state
might, for simplicity if for no other reason, focus upon the deceased person as the object of its concern. 43 It is not necessary, in
order to justify this choice, to "presume" that the residence of the
beneficiaries follows that of the deceased, nor to indulge in dubious
generalizations to the effect that dependent relatives usually live
40

Renlund v. Commodore Mining Co., 89 Minn. 41, 47, 93 N.W. io57, IO59

(,903).
41 ILL. REv. STAT.

ch. 70,

§§

X, 2 (i957); North Pier Terminal Co. ex rel.

192, 83 N.E.2d 748
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp., 402 InI.
(1949).
42
WIs. STAT. §§ 331.03-04 (1957); Swanson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 264 Wis. 274, 58 N.W.2d 664 (i953); Herro v. Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 37 N.W.2d
874 (1949); Brown v. Chicago & N. Ry, 102 Wis. 137, 77 N.W. 748 (1899).
42 Cf. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, io STA-. L. REV.

205, 221-22 (1958).

,
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with their benefactor. In life-insurance cases the courts tend to
assume that the protective policies of a state are directed toward
the insured rather than the beneficiaries.44 If the deceased is
within the scope of the state's protective policy, the courts have
seldom denied the benefits of a wrongful-death statute solely on
the ground that the claimant is a nonresident, even when he is an
alien.4" Indeed, the protection afforded by a wrongful-death statute is comparable to that afforded by a policy of insurance against
accidental death: each resident of the state is assured that, in the
event his death is caused by the wrong of another, his dependents
will have a right to indemnity from the wrongdoer. The resident
himself benefits from this assurance; it is valuable to him in the
same way that a contract of accident insurance payable to his
dependents would be.46
We may, therefore, conclude that Wisconsin should logically
desire that the benefits provided by its statute should be available whenever the deceased was a resident, or domiciliary, of Wisconsin.41 From the standpoint of Wisconsin's interests the place
where the injury occurred is totally irrelevant. It is true that this
fact was not appreciated by the Wisconsin legislature. The statute creating the right of action for wrongful death expressly provided that it should apply only to deaths "caused in this state." "'
This, however, is the very provision whose constitutionality is un""See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Czi. L. REv. 9, 38 (1958).
45 Tns'AY, DEATH BY WRONGruL AcT § 86 (2d ed. 1913). Wisconsin at one
time adhered to a minority position denying relief to nonresident aliens. McMillan v. Spider Lake Saw Mill & Lumber Co., 115 Wis. 332, 91 N.W. 979 (1902),
but the statute was amended, Wis. Laws i9ii, ch. 226, to alter this position.
4'On the constitutional level, for purposes of the privileges-and-immunities
clause, this interpretation is contradicted by Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
207 U.S. 142 (1907). Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 6i n.6 (i951 ; Broderick
v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642 n.3 (935). The interpretation in the text is supported,
however, by the well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the
Chambers case, supra at 15i, 157-6o. Professor Schofield's ridicule of "the highly
artificial conception that a dead man may be enough of a live one to receive a
legislative grant of the right to bring a lawsuit" is a mere flippancy. Schofield, The
Claim of a Federal Right to Enforce in One State the Death Statute of Another,
3 ILL. L. REv. 65, 66 (19o8). See note go infra.
4
This is not to say that the benefits of the statute are to be confined to residents or domiciliaries. The privileges-and-immunities clause and the equalprotection clause will to some extent require equal treatment for nonresidents.
See Rzv.
STAT. § 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952). See also note 27 supra.
"8 Wis. Stat. § 331.03 (i947) (now Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1957)).
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der discussion. Doubtless it was included because of territorialist
doctrine denying the state legislative jurisdiction over injuries
abroad, and not as a voluntary delimitation of the scope of the
legislative policy.
From the standpoint of the interests of Illinois the place of
injury is equally irrelevant. Illinois' policy is similar to that of
Wisconsin, and the benefits of its statute are primarily designed
for the families of deceased residents of Illinois. In ordinary
cases of personal injury, not resulting in death, the circumstance
that the injury occurred within a state provides a legitimate basis
for the assertion by that state of an interest in awarding the compensation provided by its laws; otherwise the injured person may
become a public charge, and local creditors who have furnished
medical and other services and supplies may go unpaid. 9 This
basis is not present, however, under a typical wrongful-death
statute such as the one in force in Illinois, since the proceeds of
the judgment belong to the statutory beneficiaries and are not
available to pay claims against the decedent's estate.5 °
Hughes v. Fetter was, therefore, a case in which-Wisconsin
properly had an interest in the application of its compensatory
policy, and Illinois had no interest at all.5 ' It is Wisconsin that is
concerned with the relatives of its deceased citizen. It is Wiscon" Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
50See City of Chicago v. Major, i8 Il1. 349 (1857); Voorhees v. Chicago &

A.R.R., 208 Ill. App. 86 (1917); cf. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145 (1932), discussed in Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. Rav. 9, 23 (1958).
"' In attempting to determine the policies which are embodied in the laws
of a state and the circumstances which call for the application of those policies I
speak very tentatively. I conceive my function to be that of a technician in the
conflict of laws, analyzing the interplay of varying state policies on the basis of
certain assumptions as to what the policies are and what circumstances should bring
them into play. If experts in the law of wrongful death should disagree with
these assumptions I should gladly defer to their judgment and modify the analysis
of the conflict-of-laws problem accordingly.
Thus, an argument can be made that a wrongful-death statute expresses a
policy of penalizing, and hence minimizing, wrongful conduct. The argument is
not persuasive to me, and I have elected to proceed on the assumption that the
policy is a compensatory one. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of
Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9,
27 (1958). If I am wrong in this, Illinois has an interest in applying its law and
policy because the negligent conduct occurred there. This still would not alter the
fact that Wisconsin also has an interest in compensating the family of its deceased resident, and so would not alter the principal conclusions reached here.
Similarly, I may be wrong in regarding the deceased rather than his dependent
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sin that should determine which relatives should share in the
compensation. It is Wisconsin, as the domicile of the defendants,
that is concerned with the maximum recovery to be allowed.5 2 It

is Wisconsin that is concerned with the effect of contributory
negligence 53 and with the effect upon the right to compensation
of the fact that the deceased was a passenger in the defendant's
car. 54 Wisconsin, as the home state of all the parties, is an obviously appropriate place for trial, although Illinois, despite its
lack of interest in the matter, is not necessarily an inappropriate
place, since witnesses to the occurrence may be available there."
In spite of all this, the Wisconsin courts closed their doors to
the claim by Mr. Hughes for the death of his son, saying not only
that the Wisconsin statute could not avail him but that Wisconsin
courts would not entertain an action for a death occurring elsewhere, whether under the law of Wisconsin or the law of the
place of injury. Why? No reason having the remotest bearing
on any conceivable policy of Wisconsin was suggested. The argument of the state Supreme Court was, in essence: (i) The wrongful-death statute, as we construe it, prohibits the maintenance in
our courts of an action for wrongful death unless the death
relatives as the object of the state's protective policy. Under the Illinois statute
the beneficiaries would be the next of kin, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 7o, § 2 (1947), as
amended, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 7o, § 2 (1957) - i.e., the father (of Wisconsin) and
the brother (of Illinois), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 162 (1947) (now ILL. Rrv. STAT.
ch. 3, § 162 (1957)). On the assumption that it is the residence of the beneficiaries
that is significant, Illinois would have an interest in applying its law to compensate
the brother. Under the Wisconsin statute in force at the time of death the sole
beneficiary would have been the father. Wis. Stat. § 331.04 (i947) (now Wis.
STAT. § 331.04 (I957)); cf. Cincoski v. Rogers, 4 Wis. 2d 423, 9o N.W.2d 784
(1958).
52 Maximum recovery under the Illinois statute was $x5,ooo. 1lI. Rev. Stat. ch.
70, § 2 (1947), as amended, IL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1957). Under the
Wisconsin statute it was $12,5oo, except that a parent could recover an additional
$2,5oo on account of loss of society or companionship. Wis. Stat. § 331.04(2)
(1947), as amended, Wis. STAT. § 331.04(2) (1957). In addition, § 331.o4 (i)(b)
allowed recovery of funeral expenses on behalf of the estate.
5' Wisconsin had adopted the rule of comparative negligence. Wis. Stat. § 331.045
(I947) (now WVIs.STAT. § 331.045 (z957)).
"4In Wisconsin the duty of the driver to the guest is that of ordinary care.
See Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 654, 220 N.W. 203 (X928). In Illinois the
nonpaying guest recovers only for "wilful and wanton misconduct." Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 951, § 58(a) (1947) (now ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 9 /Y2,§ 9-2o (1957)).
" Also, Illinois traffic regulations are of course relevant on the issue of negligence. See Record, pp. i5-16; Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, 58 COLum. L. REv. 964, 1021 (1958).
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was caused here; (2) there is no need to inquire into the purpose
or effect of the prohibition, or the policy of the legislature in enacting it; the policy of the state is what the legislature says it is.
The statutory provision which was the subject of this extraordinary feat of construction was a proviso appended to the end of
the section creating the cause of action for wrongful death: "provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this
state."56 These words, said the court, "seem plain enough to bar
cases not within [the statute's] . . . terms, and to exclude actions

where the wrongful act resulting in death occurred in another
state."5 7 Any other holding would "deprive the proviso of purpose or meaning." 58 To characterize this reasoning as literalism
would be to give credit where none is due. While it does share with
literalism the vice of indifference to the rationality of the meaning
given to the text, it does not share literalism's fidelity to language.
Plainly, the language said no more than that the right of action
created by the Wisconsin statute was one for local deaths; it said
nothing about actions for foreign deaths brought pursuant to foreign statutes. It seems quite clear that the purpose of the proviso
was simply to declare that the legislature had no intention of exceeding what were assumed to be the limits of its power.59 The
56

Wis. Stat. § 331.03 (1947) (now Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1957)). The proviso
was contained in the original enactment (Wis. Laws z857, ch. 71, § i, at 85) in more
extended form: "Provided, That such action shall be brought for a death caused in
this State, and in some court established by the constitution and laws of the
same." The second clause was dropped in the compilation of 1898 (Wis. Stat. §
4255 (1898)) with the explanation: "As a denial of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts the omitted clause is void. See Bigelow v. Nickerson, 7o Fed. Rep. 113, 120;
Railway Co. v. Whiton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270. No good reason is perceived for
retaining it and thereby possibly barring an action in the courts of another state."
Cf. the Alabama statute involved in the George case, Ala. Civ. Code § 611S (19o7).
57 257 Wis. at 37, 42 N.W.2d at 453.
'8 Id.at 42, 42 N.W.2d at 455.
5 As was said of the Illinois statute: "It could not have included matters occurring outside the State, because the legislature has no authority over the conduct of individuals outside the State and its acts have no extra-territorial effect."
Crane v. Chicago & W.I.R.R., 233 Il. 259, 265, 84 N.E. 222, 224 (1908) (dissenting
opinion). "In many cases arising under similar acts, it has been held that the action
could not be maintained if the fatal injury occurred outside of the jurisdiction of the
state in which the statute relied on was enacted; that, if it appears that the injury occurred outside of the state, and it did not appear that the law of such state
gave such a remedy, there could be no recovery." Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry., 94 Wis. 191, 195, 68 N.W. 661, 662 (1896). "The object and effect of the [original] proviso to our statute was to render the action local, and limit it to cases where
" Id. at
death was caused by acts committed or occurring within the state ....
x95-96, 68 N.W. at 662.

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 50 1959-1960

THE TRANSITORY CAUSE OF ACTION

1959]

same court had previously held that an action could be maintained
in Wisconsin under the Illinois death statute.6 0 This it held even
though the deceased was a resident of Illinois, and despite the
fact that the Illinois death statute expressly prohibited actions
in Illinois for deaths occurring outside the state. The court rejected the argument that Wisconsin should retaliate against Illinois, asserting that "the citizens of other states have the same
right to sue in the courts of Wisconsin that citizens of Wisconsin
have." 61 This precedent was tossed aside in Hughes with the comment that the court had not given "due consideration" to the
proviso. 2 There was not the slightest suggestion of any reason
why the Wisconsin legislature might have wished to exclude actions under foreign statutes for foreign deaths - especially where
the deceased was a resident of Wisconsin. It was enough to read
the statute as excluding them. "The policy of Wisconsin against
the maintenance of such an action having been created positively
in a statute, that policy must prevail" 6' -whatever the reason,
or lack of reason, supporting the attribution of the policy to the
legislature.
The provision of the Illinois statute excluding actions for foreign death was added, in unmistakably clear terms, by amendment in i9o3.4 Thus the Illinois court started with a legislative

declaration which the Wisconsin court inferred only by a tortured process of construction. The Illinois court, however, did
no better than the Wisconsin court in the matter of elucidating
the reasons for the legislative policy. "When the legislature
speaks . . . public policy is what the statute indicates."

65

The

reasons for such a policy must be sought elsewhere, and with no
great prospect that a candid statement of them will be found.
It has been suggested that the Wisconsin policy was merely one
60 Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935).
61

62

6

Id. at 593, 260 N.W. at 635.
257 Wis. at 41, 42 N.W.2d at 455.

1Id. at 38,

42

N.W.2d at 453.

6, Ill. Laws x9o3, at 217-i8, as amended, ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 70, §

2

(1957):

"Provided further, that no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State, to
recover damages for a death occurring outside of this State .

. . ."

It may be

significant that the same amendment increased the maximum recovery from $5,ooo
to $io,ooo.
65 Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 372, 99 N.E.
619, 621 (1912). This decision denied recovery, under the New Jersey statute, for
the death in New Jersey of a citizen of Illinois.
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of retaliation against Illinois. 66 As an interpretation of legislative
policy this involves an anachronism, since the exclusionary proviso was contained in the original Wisconsin statute of 1857 "'

while the corresponding proviso in the Illinois statute was added
by amendment in 19o3. 6' The suggestion can mean only that the
Wisconsin court's interpretation of the statute in 1949 was mo-

tivated by a desire to retaliate. Such an explanation, of course,
contributes nothing toward constitutional justification of the decision. Also, if there is any truth in the explanation, the action
of the Wisconsin court was singularly irrational. The same court
had previously rejected an invitation to retaliate, and had allowed
an action in Wisconsin against a Wisconsin resident for the death
in Illinois of an Illinois resident."9 Conceivably, a court might come
to regret such magnanimity, and might adopt the opposite principle: Since Illinois does not permit actions for the deaths of Wisconsin residents in Wisconsin, we will not permit actions for the
deaths of Illinois residents in Illinois. But Hughes v. Fetter will
not bear such an interpretation. On the theory of retaliation, the
court must be understood as embracing the principle that because
Illinois will not entertain an action for the death of an Illinois
resident in Wisconsin, Wisconsin will not entertain an action for
the death of a Wisconsin resident in Illinois. If that is indeed
the principle, Wisconsin has provided what may be history's
clearest illustration of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.
At all events, whether in a spirit of retaliation or not, the Wisconsin court did establish the same exclusionary rule that was established by statute in Illinois. Since it gave no reasons for doing
so, the question becomes: Why would any state desire to establish
such an exclusionary rule? In attempting to answer this question,
and to evaluate some of the answers which have been suggested,
we may resort to such evidence as there is concerning the purpose
of the Illinois proviso. Until the Wisconsin court aligned itself
with the Illinois policy, the Illinois statute was nearly unique."
88

Brief for Appellant, p. 18; ioo U. PA. L. REv. 126, 130 (i95i). The
appellant also suggested that the "policy" was "a mere assertion of local inertia or
indifference . . . ." Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
"7 Wis. Laws 1857, ch. 7!, § i, at 85, as amended, Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (i957).
"1Ill. Laws i9o3, at 217, as amended, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1957).
61 Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 26o N.W. 633 (x935).
1o See TnTm y, DEATH BY WRONOGTuL ACT §§ x95-2O2 (2d ed. 1913). See generally Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MIc. L. Rv.
545, 572-77 (i935). The only comparable provision was the qualified one in the
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There appears to be no record of any statement as to its purpose.
It does, however, seem to be related to the hostile attitude which
often led courts to refuse to enforce claims for wrongful death on
the ground that the foreign cause of action was "penal" or that the
forum state did not have a similar statute; "' and there are certain
judicial decisions in Illinois which are relevant to a consideration
of arguments advanced in justification of the unstated policy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, sought to aid the Wisconsin Supreme Court by suggesting some kind of reasonable content for the policy:
The decision of Wisconsin to open its courts to actions for wrongful deaths within the State but close them to actions for deaths outside the State may not satisfy everyone's notion of wise policy ...
But it is neither novel nor without reason. .

.

. Wisconsin may be

willing to grant a right of action where witnesses will be available
in Wisconsin and the courts are acquainted with a detailed local
statute and cases construing it. It may not wish to subject residents to suit where out-of-state witnesses will be difficult to bring
before the court, and where the court will be faced with the alternative of applying a complex foreign statute- perhaps inconissues -or fitting the
sistent with that of Wisconsin on7important
2
statute to the Wisconsin pattern.
Insofar as this suggests that the policy rests upon a disinclination
to apply unfamiliar foreign law it assumes that the foreign law
will or must be applied, and so ignores the majority's tenth footnote, disclaiming any holding to that effect. Moreover, as Professor Reese has justly observed, if unwillingness to apply foreign
law is an adequate excuse for refusing to do so, the requirement
of full faith and credit to public acts is rendered meaningless."
Both objections - unfamiliarity with foreign law and difficulty of
access to witnesses - would apply with equal force to actions for
personal injuries sustained outside the state; yet such actions are
regularly entertained by both Wisconsin and Illinois. 4 Shortly
Ohio statute involved in Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,

207

U.S.

142

(19o7). See

note go infra.
"1See TIFANY, op. cit. supra note 70, §§ 197, 198, z98-i; Rose, supra note

70, at 559-65.
72 341 U.S. at 68-g.
73 Reese, supra note 22, at 346.
"4The statement in Rose, supra note 7o, at 576, that the Illinois exclusionary
policy extends to actions for personal injuries is erroneous.
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before the 1903 amendment, the Illinois court was urged on
similar grounds to refuse to hear an action for the death in Indiana of a resident of Illinois. Although the Indiana law differed
from that of Illinois in that it abrogated the fellow-servant rule,
the court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, saying: "Every
day our courts are enforcing rights under foreign contracts where
the lex loci contractusand the lex fori are altogether different, and
yet we construe these contracts and enforce rights under them
according to their force and effect under the law of the State
where made." 71
In addition, there are the following solid indications that the
policy of Illinois, at least, was not one of avoiding the trial of cases
in which it would be necessary to apply foreign law or in which
it would be difficult to obtain the testimony of witnesses to the
occurrence:
(i) The proviso was held to preclude action in Illinois under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act for death in another state.7 6
Of course, the law applicable in such an action is the same federal
law which would apply in a case of death in Illinois.
(2)
The proviso was held to preclude action in Illinois on a
judgment for wrongful 'death obtained in the state of injury."
Of course, in such an action there could be no problem of interpreting the foreign statute or of procuring the attendance of
witnesses.
(3) In construing the peculiar language of the proviso (" [N] o
action shall be brought . . . in this State to recover damages
for a death occurring outside of this State . . ."),78 the courts

held that an action could be maintained where a resident of Illinois was injured in Indiana and later died in a hospital in Illinois.7
" Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. Rouse, 178 Ill. 132, 137, 52 N.E. 951, 952

(1899)

(quoting with approval from an early Minnesota decision).
6 Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill.563, 115 N.E. 2, writ of error dismissed on motion

of plaintiff in error, 245 U.S. 675 (x97). After the 7-to-2 decision in First Nat'l
Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952), the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that it was unconstitutional to refuse to take jurisdiction of a wrongful-death
action arising under the FELA where the death occurred outside the state. Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill.
2d 164, L33 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956).
" Kenny v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 285 Ill.
X88, 12o N.E. 63r
(xgi8), rev'd, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).

78 Ill. Laws 19o3, at 217, as amended, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (,957). (Emphasis added.)
Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 1s Ill. App. 32 (1909).
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Thus Illinois allowed the action to be maintained although both
of the difficulties suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter were
present: The action was predicated on a foreign statute and witnesses to the occurrence were, by hypothesis, more readily available in Indiana than in Illinois.
The two difficulties mentioned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter are
among the factors commonly considered by courts in applying
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 80 In an appropriate case
these, along with other factors, may justify a state's refusal to
entertain a cause of action having foreign aspects. Where, however, all parties are residents of the forum state, the mere fact
that it may be necessary to inquire into foreign law, or that it
may be impossible to compel the attendance of occurrence witnesses, is hardly enough to justify dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.
Various other attempts have been made to elucidate the policy
embodied in the restrictive provisos. Thus, according to one commentator:
The Wisconsin death statute of 1857 was one of the first, and in
those days, because of the strangeness of the new action and the
uncertainty of the law concerning the enforcement of foreign
statutory rights, courts were most reluctant to entertain suits
on deaths occurring outside of their jurisdiction. . . . The real
basis of the restrictive proviso in the original Wisconsin statute
was probably the fear and doubt of the courts in enforcing these
new rights.81
We have already observed that the "real basis" of the proviso in
the original Wisconsin statute was probably to delimit the application of the statute, and not to exclude actions for death outside the state. Passing that point, we may concede that there was
indeed considerable hostility toward the enforcement of claims
predicated on deaths outside the forum state, evidenced by the
tendency to deny enforcement on the ground that the action was
penal, or that there was no similar local statute, or that maintenance of the action would be contrary to local policy. To say,
Compare Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 94 Wis. x9i , 68 N.W. 66i
(1896) (interpretation of Wisconsin proviso, "[Flor a death caused in this
state ....
).
80 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 5oi, 508-0

9

a1 100 U. PA. L. REv. 126, 129 (195X).
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however, that this hostility was motivated by "fear and doubt"
does little to explain what the motivation actually was; at the
very least, fear and doubt arising from the novelty of the statutory remedy could hardly justify the decision of the Wisconsin
court in 1949. In somewhat similar vein we are told that while
there was an initial desire to facilitate recovery by opening the
courts to foreign suits, "abuse" by plaintiffs of this liberal policy
led to its reconsideration.8" Just how this abuse manifested itself
is not disclosed. There is little indication that the nationwide
forum-shopping with which we are familiar in modern times was
practiced on an alarming scale in 1903 8 - to say nothing of
1857. If there was a similar problem, it probably extended then,

as now, to personal injury as well as wrongful-death actions, and
could have been handled on the principle of forum non conveniens.
No reason yet appears why the solution should have been confined to wrongful-death cases, and to the drastic device of denying all remedy where the injury or death occurred outside the
state, regardless of other considerations.
If I may be permitted a speculation of my own as to the "real"
purpose of the restrictive proviso in the Illinois statute, I suggest
that the purpose was to achieve by indirection and approximation an objective which -

it was thought -

could not be achieved

directly. There was, indeed, doubt and fear about the new
remedy which had been engrafted on the common law. It was
no doubt with hesitation that the states conferred the new right
even on local residents at the expense of other local residents. It
was decidedly unsettling to contemplate the enforcement of such
a right at the suit of a nonresident against a resident - particularly since the nonresident might sue under a foreign statute
drawn with less solicitude for the defendant than was the local
statute. It is to be remembered that at the time in question
legislation authorizing substituted service upon a nonresident who
had caused injury or death in a state was nonexistent and almost
82

Rose, supra note 7o, at 552. Another suggested explanation, which seems

highly unlikely, is that the legislature passing an exclusionary statute such as that
of Illinois "acted unwittingly and inadvertently, evidently not seeing or intending
the necessary practical operation and effect of the statutes to deny private rights
secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Schofield, Comment, 13 ILL. L. Rxv. 43, 52 (1g8).
83 But see Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St. 16, 30, 76 N.E. 9i,
95 (I905), aff'd, 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
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unthinkable."4 I suggest that the Illinois legislature reasoned as
follows: Actions brought in Illinois for deaths occurring elsewhere
are likely to be actions for the deaths of nonresidents, brought
against Illinois residents or business enterprises. The person
killed outside the state is more likely to be a nonresident than a
resident of Illinois; the action is likely to be brought here because
this, as his home, is the only state in which process can be served
on the defendant. While these assumptions are not strictly accurate, the exceptions will be relatively rare. By precluding actions
here for deaths elsewhere we can approximate the objective of
denying recovery to a nonresident killed by a resident of this state.
The rare cases in which an Illinois resident is killed elsewhere by a
tortfeasor suable here can be written off for the sake of the larger
gain. If a nonresident is killed in this state by a local resident
there will be a recovery, which may seem to discriminate against
our resident killed abroad, but at least the local defendant will
have the protection of our own statute.
This is a technique well established in the conflict of laws."5
Support for the view that this is what the Illinois legislature was
up to in 1903 may be found in the unfolding of a similar legislative development in Ohio. At one time it was assumed that no ac84 "At the time the first edition of the Restatement was written, the reporter

and his advisers felt that they were taking a very advanced step when they
incorporated into the draft provisions for jurisdiction over the absent itinerant
motorist who had an accident in the state." Goodrich, Foreword to RESTATEMENT
(SEcoxD), CorLicT or LAWs at v (Tent. Draft No. 3, I956).
85 In two well-known cases on the statute of frauds the Delaware court and
the Massachusetts court declared that the policy of the statute was to protect local
citizens and then set about candidly to determine the choice-of-law rule which
would afford the maximum degree of protection to those beneficiaries. The Delaware court, apparently reasoning that most contracts made by Delawareans would
be made in Delaware, elected to hold the statute "substantive," -i.e., applicable
to contracts made in Delaware. Lams v. H. F. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, z78 Atl. 651
(1935). The court's confidence in the general tendency of the rule was apparently
not shaken by the fact that in the case at bar the result was to deprive a Delaware
corporation of the protection of the local statute. The Massachusetts court, dealing with the narrower problem of contracts to make a will, estimated the probabilities differently: Actions on such contracts were likely to be brought at the domicile; therefore maximum protection for Massachusetts citizens could be attained
by holding the statute "procedural" so that it applied to all actions in Massachusetts irrespective of where the contract was made. Mr. justice Holmes, speaking
for the court, went further, and served notice that if in operation the rule did not
produce results consistent with the protective policy, the rule could be modified
as the occasion might arise. Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026
(1895).
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tion could be brought in Ohio for a wrongful death occurring
outside the state.86 Then, in 1894, the legislature adopted a policy
of reciprocity: Ohio would enforce causes of action under a foreign statute if the state of injury would similarly enforce rights
asserted under the Ohio statute.8 7 This policy was abandoned in
1902, the statute being amended to provide generally for the enforcement of causes of action for wrongful death under foreign
law - provided the deceased was "a citizen of this state."8 8
Thus Ohio boldly stated its selfish and discriminatory policy:
The burdens imposed on local defendants by the wrongful-death
act were solely for the benefit of local citizens and such sojourners
as might happen to be injured in the state. Persons injured elsewhere, even by Ohio citizens or enterprises, were to have no re" See Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 149 (I9O7); Baltimore

& O.R.R. v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St. i6, 25, 76 N.E. 91, 93 (I905); Wabash R.R. v.
Fox, 64 Ohio St. I33, 141, 59 N.E. 888, 889 (i9oI). Contrary to statements in these
cases, the proposition seems to have rested on assumption rather than "established
law."

Woodard v. Michigan S. & N.I.R.R., io

Ohio St. 121, 124 (1859),

held

only that an Ohio administrator could not sue under the Illinois statute, and
expressly left open the question whether an Illinois administrator might do so.
Two other cases held only that the Ohio statute did not apply to injuries sustained
elsewhere. Hover 'v. Pennsylvania Co., 25 Ohio St. 667 (874)
(memorandum
opinion); Brooks v. Railway Co., 53 Ohio St. 655, 44 N.E. 1131 (1895) (memorandum opinion).
8791 Ohio Laws 408 (1894).

It should be noted that a reciprocity statute is

quite consistent with the kind of thinking which has been attributed to the
Illinois legislature. Assuming that the general objective is to reserve for local residents the benefits of the liability imposed on local tortfeasors, the first concession that is likely to be made is one on the basis of reciprocity -especially if the
safeguards of the local statute are secured to the local defendant; and the Ohio
legislature carefully stipulated that the recovery allowed under the statute of the
reciprocating state must not exceed the maximum provided by the Ohio statute.
88 95 Ohio Laws 401 (1902). As has been observed, such exclusionary statutes are

related to judicial devices such as denial of recovery because the foreign death
statute is dissimilar, or penal, or contrary to the public policy of the forum.
While we cannot pursue those judicial devices in detail here, it is instructive to
compare the relevant development in New York as reflected in the well-known
case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 12o N.E. 198 (ig8). Without
intending to detract anything from the altruism and liberality of Judge Cardozo's
eloquent opinion, one may point out that the deceased, who was killed in Massachusetts, was a resident of New York, and his surviving widow and children also
resided there. Id. at 102, Iii, 12o N.E. at 298, 202. Faced with the problem of
what to do with actions against local defendants under foreign statutes, New
York did not react as Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin did; it refrained from discriminating against nonresidents, and from discriminating against its own residents
to that end. Even so, the court, strongly influenced by the obligatio theory, failed
to give the family the measure of protection which New York policy required.
Id. at 112, 22o N.E. at 202.
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dress in Ohio, either under Ohio law or under the law of the state
of injury -unless they were citizens of Ohio.
It is not unlikely that this amendment of the Ohio statute, passed
May 6, 1902, came to the attention of Senator Corbus P. Gardner, of La Salle County, Illinois, who on March 24, 1903 introduced Senate Bill 431, which resulted in the amendment of the
Illinois statute to exclude actions for wrongful deaths occurring
in other states. 9 Ohio was doing just what any selfish state would
like to do: reserving the benefits of the wrongful-death statute
for local people primarily, and protecting local enterprises against
claims based on the deaths of foreigners. But was not Ohio, perhaps, going too far? Its crass, outright discrimination between
citizens of Ohio and citizens of other states obviously jeopardized
the whole scheme, because of the risk that it would be found
violative of the privileges-and-immunities clause. Senator Gardner, a lawyer, was not prepared to go so far. He proposed simply to close the courts of Illinois to actions based on injuries occurring elsewhere, thus achieving the desired result. This would
mean that an occasional citizen of Illinois who might be killed
elsewhere by a fellow citizen would be deprived of the protection
of Illinois law; but Senator Gardner and the Illinois legislature
were content to take the bitter with the sweet. The risk that the
entire scheme would be invalidated on constitutional grounds if
its purpose were achieved too completely or too explicitly dictated
such a degree of impartiality.9
9 Ill. Laws i9O3, at 217-18.
10 In fact, of course, thanks to an extraordinarily inept decision of the Supreme Court, Ohio got away with its extreme discrimination. Chambers v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907). Essentially, the Court reached its surprising result by focusing upon the beneficiary, or the plaintiff- it is not clear
which-as the object of the Constitution's protection, so that discrimination
based upon citizenship of the deceased became immaterial. This was a corollary
of the emphasis upon the right of access to courts as the privilege or immunity in
question, as distinguished from the substantial protection afforded to the potential
victim by the wrongful-death statute. The triviality of this distinction is emphasized by the fact that the protection of the Constitution was made to depend
upon whether the statute provided for survival of a right of action originally
vested in the deceased, or created a "new" cause of action. 2o7 U.S. at 1i.
In Hughes v. Fetter, the Chambers case was distinguished on the ground that
there the full-faith-and-credit clause was not invoked. 341 U.S. at 6xi n.6. This
circumstance may give rise to an inference that, in a repetition of the Chambers
situation today, the Court would hold that Ohio is required by the full-faith-andcredit clause to entertain the action. But the Chambers case did not involve that
discrimination against local residents which, according to the analysis in this
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This, it may be conceded, is a rather speculative interpretation
of the policy underlying the decision of the Wisconsin court in
Hughes v. Fetter. If it is accepted, the interpretation means that
in an effort to accomplish by indirection and approximation a
discrimination against nonresidents, Wisconsin imposed an arbitrary and capricious discrimination against certain of its own
residents - namely, those whose deaths resulted from injuries inflicted outside the state. But it is not necessary to accept this interpretation in order to reach the conclusion which is suggested
here. The important result of this rather wide-ranging effort to
find an explanation for the strange behavior of the Wisconsin
court is that no rational and constitutionally defensible explanation can be found. The inescapable fact is that Wisconsin, in its
wrongful-death statute, established a policy for the protection of
Wisconsin residents generally, and then excluded from the protection of that policy a certain class of residents: those whose
deaths resulted from injuries received elsewhere. Since no constitutionally tenable policy of the state relating either to the administration of its courts or to any of its other governmental concerns can be suggested which can justify this classification, the
classification is arbitrary and capricious. 9 The vice, therefore,
of the state action in Hughes v. Fetterwas that it denied to members of the disfavored class the equal protection of the laws."
paper, supplied the constitutional basis for the holding that Wisconsin must entertain the action in Hughes. It seems much more likely that the Court, following
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Chambers, would hold that Ohio's discrimination
against citizens of other states violated the privileges-and-immunities clause (a
result which would entail no implication that Ohio is required to apply the law of
the state of the injury). Even this result seems unlikely, however, on the precise
facts of Chambers, since the defendant was a Maryland corporation and the facts
strongly suggest a situation in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens may
be appropriately invoked.
91 Choice of law is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet it is pertinent to suggest that if it is true that (i) Wisconsin has an interest in the application of its
wrongful-death statute in the circumstances of Hughes v. Fetter, and that (2)
Illinois has no interest in the application of its statute, and that (3) the distinction
drawn by Wisconsin between residents killed at home and residents killed elsewhere is arbitrary and capricious, then it should follow that Wisconsin is required
by the Constitution not only to entertain the action but to apply Wisconsin
law. The application of Illinois law instead would be a denial of due process.
See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. CmI. L. REv. 9 (X958); Currie, Survival of Actions:
Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, io STAN. L. R a. 205,
239 (1958).
12 See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § x. Professor Henry Schofield, who in 1918
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The reliance of the Supreme Court on the full-faith-and-credit
clause was both unnecessary and confusing.
This view of the matter finds interesting support in an early
case concerning the restrictive proviso in the Illinois statute.
The language of the proviso, it will be recalled, barred suits "to
recover damages for a death occurring outside of this State." "
Less than a year after the proviso was enacted, a train collided in
Cook County with a milk wagon occupied by one Frederick Frank
and his two sons, all residents of Illinois. Frederick Frank died
the following morning; one of the boys was not seriously injured;
the other was removed a few miles from the scene of the accident
to a hospital in Indiana, where he died. In the action for the death
of the child, the railroad obtained a directed verdict because death
occurred outside Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed,
construing the statute as giving a cause of action where the
"wrongful act, neglect or default" occurs within the state 4 Justices Dunn and Carter concurred in the result but took sharp issue
with this construction of "plain and unambiguous" language."
The proviso meant exactly what it said: An action may not
be brought in Illinois to recover damages for a death occurring
outside the state. But the proviso was unconstitutional as establishing an arbitrary discrimination and hence denying the equal
protection of the laws. 6 "The place where death occurs is a mere
incident." 1 From the standpoint of the state's concern for the
welfare of its own people, and of its obligation to administer its
protective policies impartially, the place of injury - or of the
"wrongful act, neglect or default" - is equally a mere incident,
at least so far as the right of access to local courts is concernedf 8
took the position that the Illinois and Wisconsin exclusionary policies were in
violation of the full-faith-and-credit clause, also suggested the possible applicability of the equal-protection clause. Schofield, Comment, 13 ILL. L. REv. 43, 52 n.io
(I918).
" Ill. Laws 19o3, at 217, 218. (Emphasis added.)
14 Crane v. Chicago & W. Ind. R.R., 233 Ill. 259, 262, 84 N.E. 222, 223 (I9o8).

9 Id. at 265, 84 N.E. at 225.
Id. at 264, 84 N.E. at 224.
97
Ibid.
98 In support of their position, the concurring justices cited In re Day, I81 In.
73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899), and Sanitary Dist. v. Bernstein, 175 Ill.
215, 218, 5i N.E.
720, 721 (1898). Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 384 (1959): "The amount and type of recovery which a foreign seaman may
receive from his foreign employer while sailing on a foreign ship should not depend
on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of the place of injury."
On the level of the federal Constitution, it can hardly be doubted that the right
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To deny the right of access to local courts merely because the injury occurred across the state line, when the deceased and the
tortfeasor are both residents of the state, is to withhold a remedy
for an arbitrary and capricious reason, having no relation to any
defensible state policy, and is therefore a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
This view of the matter has the advantage of reconciling the
holding in Hughes v. Fetter, that Wisconsin must entertain the
action, with the reservation in the Court's tenth footnote of the
right of Wisconsin to apply its own law. So long as the obligation
to provide a forum is rested on the full-faith-and-credit clause, the
results reached by the opinion and the footnote are irreconcilable.
When the obligation to provide a forum is rested on the equalprotection clause, however, the conflict disappears entirely. The
view that the opinion and the footnote are compatible, and that
the vice of the Wisconsin action consisted in its discriminatory
character, is supported by the subsequent decision in Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co. 9 The Court held that the district court in
of access to courts is one which is safeguarded by the equal-protection clause.
See i6 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § i981 (1952); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); cf. Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
207 U.S. 142, 248 (19o7) (privileges-and-immunities clause). The question of who,
in the context of a wrongful-death action, is entitled to the protection, is somewhat beclouded by the unfortunate decision in the Chambers case. See note 90
supra. It seems both reasonable and convenient to assume that the person protected is the decedent. See pp. 46-47 supra. But so far as Hughes v. Fetter is
concerned, the difficulty is unimportant since the deceased, the beneficiary, and
the administrator were all residents of Wisconsin. Even if it be assumed that the
person protected is the deceased, it may be objected that a Wisconsin resident
injured outside Wisconsin is not a person "within its jurisdiction," U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § i, but this seems a mere quibble. The constitutional phrase certainly
does not mean "physically present within its territorial limits," and probably
means all persons within the scope of the state's laws. See Kentucky Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., supra. See also Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522 (2959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (i949). Whatever may
be the status of the right to sue in Wisconsin for the out-of-state death of a
nonresident, see note 9o supra, the right to sue in Wisconsin for the out-of-state
death of a Wisconsin resident should be secure.
o9 345 U.S. 514 (1953). Pennsylvania had no rule excluding actions for wrongful death occurring elsewhere, so that the question of the obligation to provide a
forum did not arise. Since the deceased was a resident of Alabama, id. at 5ig, the
argument in the text, that equal protection required Wisconsin to provide a forum
in Hughes v. Fetter, is inapplicable. If Pennsylvania had an obligation to entertain the action in Wells, it must rest on some other constitutional principle. See
note 90 supra.
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Pennsylvania was under no obligation to respect the provision of
the statute of the state of injury concerning the time within which
suit might be brought, 0 0 but was perfectly free to apply Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. In so doing the Court reaffirmed
the principle of the footnote in Hughes v. Fetter,and so gave support to the view that the obligation of Wisconsin to provide a
forum in that case did not arise from the full-faith-and-credit
clause. The "crucial factor" in that decision was "that the forum
laid an uneven hand on causes of action arising within and without the forum state. Causes of action arising in sister states were
discriminated against."''
One does not discriminate against
causes of action, but against people. Wisconsin's discrimination in
Hughes v. Fetter was against its own residents, and denied them
equal protection. Despite the holding in Chambers v. Baltimore
& O.R.R.,102 similar discrimination against citizens of another
state may be a denial of the privileges and immunities of state
citizenship. But the full-faith-and-credit clause says nothing
about discrimination; and where the forum is free to apply its
own rather than the foreign law it is difficult to see what the
full-faith-and-credit clause has to do with the constitutional obligation to provide a forum. 3
Shortly after Wisconsin's discriminatory policy of excluding
actions for out-of-state deaths was invalidated, the similar policy adopted by Illinois met the same fate.'0 4 Essentially the case
100

Cf.

Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207,

2XO

(1955); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S.

33, 38 (1926).
101

345 U.S. at 51S-ig. (Emphasis added.)
U.S. 142 (907). See note go supra.

102 207

" 3 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514, 519 (953) is flatly inconsistent with the footnote in Hughes
v. Fetter. It proceeds on two grounds: (x) Despite the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the Erie doctrine does not require a federal
district court to apply state choice-of-law rules in tort cases; and (2) under the
full-faith-and-credit clause the forum is required to apply the substantive law
of the state of injury, the statute of limitations in this case being regarded as
substantive. "I had supposed, before Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 6og, that the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania could close its doors to trial of this case. But
no one would have questioned, I should think, that if the cause were entertained
it must be tried in accordance with the law of the place of the wrong." 345 U.S.
at 522-23. The sharp conflict between this territorialist position and the policyoriented footnote serves to emphasize the footnote's significance. Yet it is disconcerting to note that Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the footnote in Hughes v.
Fetter,concurred in this dissent.
'o' First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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presented the same problem as Hughes v. Fetter, and the Court
so held. The deceased was a resident and citizen of Illinois; the
plaintiff executor was an Illinois bank; the defendant was a
Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in
Illinois. 10 5 Thus the argument which has been made with respect to Hughes v. Fetter is applicable here: In refusing a
forum because of the fortuitous circumstance that death occurred outside the state, Illinois discriminated arbitrarily against
some of its own residents. Only two circumstances differentiating
the Illinois case require mention: (i) The action was brought in
a United States district court in Illinois rather than in a state
court. The holding that the proviso, if valid as applied to the
state courts, would deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction is
of importance in the present context only because it brings to
mind an additional reason why the Chambers case should be
overruled if it is not already thoroughly discredited. 1 6 (2) In
1935 the exclusionary proviso in the Illinois statute had been
amended to provide that actions for out-of-state death were
barred only where "a right of action for such death exists under
the laws of the place where such death occurred and service of
process in such suit may be had upon the defendant in such
place." 107 On our assumption that the main purpose of the
proviso of 1903 was to discriminate against nonresidents, this
was a substantial amelioration of the discriminatory policy. A
nonresident injured outside Illinois could now sue an Illinois
tortfeasor not amenable to process elsewhere. Because of this,
it was not unreasonable for the defendant to entertain the hope
that Hughes v. Fetterwas distinguishable. As amended, the proviso appeared to express simply a policy of not burdening the
Illinois courts with such litigation except when the interests of
justice should require that Illinois provide a forum - a policy
generally similar to that expressed in the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Indeed, the court of appeals distinguished Hughes
5

10 Id. at 396-97; Record, p. 45; Petition for Certiorari, p. i8.
1o

See note go supra. The Ohio Supreme Court had justified its condonation

of the Ohio exclusionary statute on the ground that, in cases of diversity of
citizenship, actions for out-of-state deaths of noncitizens of Ohio might be brought
in the federal courts. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St. 16, 29, 76 N.E.
gi, 95 (go5).
Whatever weight might have been attached to this mitigating circumstance at the time, the alternative of a federal forum in the state is no longer
available.
E.g., Angel v. Buffington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (i947).
"°7 Ill. Laws 1935, at gx6 (now ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1957)).

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 64 1959-1960

19591

THE TRANSITORY CAUSE OF ACTION

v. Fetter on just such grounds.10 8 In First Natl Bank v. United
Air Lines, Inc.' the Supreme Court reversed, saying only that
the command of the full-faith-and-credit clause was as strong
in the one case as in the other. This can hardly be taken to mean
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens, established for the
federal courts in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,"0 is repudiated. Probably the meaning is that the relationship of the parties to Illinois
was such that the case was not an appropriate one for application
of that doctrine. The analysis suggested in this paper enables
one to make much the same point in a more forceful way: While
the 1935 amendment to the exclusionary proviso mitigated the
discrimination against nonresidents, it did nothing to remove
the arbitrary discrimination which deprived one class of Illinois
residents of the protection of the Illinois wrongful-death statute,
including their personal representatives' right of access to the
courts of their home state."' It is ironical that Illinois, having
abandoned the policy of discrimination against nonresidents
which was the original purpose of the proviso, retained the discrimination against its own residents which was only a distasteful
incident of that policy." 2
lo8 First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., x9o F.2d 493, 494-95 (7th Cir.
'951).
lo 342 U.S. 396, 398 (1952).
110330 U.S. 501 (i947); cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612-13 (I95).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
"I If residents of Ilinois generally are accorded the right of access to Illinois
courts, it is not sufficient to say to an arbitrarily selected class of residents that
they must be content with a remedy in a foreign court. "Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only where
its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality
of legal right must be maintained." Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337, 350 (1938).
112 1 do not suggest that the 1935 amendment removed any ground of objection to the proviso under the privileges-and-immunities clause. See note 90 supra.
The right of access to the courts of Illinois for purposes of recovering damages
for wrongful death may depend upon (i) the relationship of the deceased to the
state; (2) the relationship of the defendant to the state; and (3) the appropriately
applicable law. In Hughes v. Fetter and United Air Lines there is strong ground for

the position that the plaintiff is entitled not only to an Illinois forum but to Illinois law as well. See note 91 supra. Since this would not be true in an action for
the out-of-state death of a nonresident, the case for an Illinois forum for such
an action is less strong. However, where the defendant is domiciled in Illinois the
privileges-and-immunities clause may require Illinois to provide a forum irrespective of the law to be applied. Full consideration of these possibilities is
beyond the scope of this article. The point in the text is simply that the 1935
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If this analysis is sound, it follows that the exclusionary policies expressed by the Wisconsin court and the Illinois legislature
are unconstitutional as applied to injuries suffered by local residents in foreign countries as well as to injuries suffered in sister
states. The discrimination and the denial of equal protection
3
of the laws is the same in either case."

III.

LOCALIZING THE "TRANSITORY"

ACTION

It is not easy to find a satisfactory definition of a transitory
action." 4 It is necessary to begin by noting that, because of the
amendment to the proviso removed, as a practical matter, the harshest features
of the discrimination against nonresidents.
"' In Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 168, 133 N.E.2d 288, 290
(1956), the court held that after the United Air Lines case Illinois could not refuse to entertain actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for out-ofstate deaths, and assumed that the restrictive proviso remained operative only
with respect to actions under the laws of foreign countries. The decedent was a
resident of Indiana and the action was against a corporation of Illinois and Indiana.
The supremely ironical touch has been added by James v. Grand Trunk W.
R.R., i4 11. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 9iS (1958). An action
by a Michigan administratrix for the death in Michigan of a Michigan resident
was brought in Illinois under the Michigan wrongful-death statute, the defendant
being incorporated in Michigan and Indiana. The defendant obtained from a
Michigan court an injunction against prosecution of the Illinois action. After
half a century of operating under the statutory policy of excluding such actions, the
Illinois court not only refused to treat the Michigan injunction as cpnclusive but,
in order to "protect its jurisdiction" of the case, id. at 368, 152 N.E.2d at 865,
authorized a counterinjunction against the defendant restraining it from enforcing the Michigan court's decree. The court conceded that the action might
be subject to dismissal on the principle of forum non conveniens, but observed that
the defendant had not invoked that principle. In this iSo-degree reversal of the
exclusionary policy which the Supreme Court had held violative of the requirement
of full faith and credit to public acts, Illinois denied full faith and credit to the
records and judicial proceedings of a sister state. See Comment, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Injunctions, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 633 (1959), which argues that,
despite authorities to the contrary, there is no warrant for excepting such judgments from the command of the full-faith-and-credit clause.
""The entry in BOUVIER, LAW DIcTIoNARY ix85 (Baldwin Century ed. 1946),
copied by most of his imitators ("an action the cause of which might have arisen
in one place or county as well as another"), is not a definition at all, but a statement of the test employed by Marshall, C.J., among others, to distinguish transitory from local actions. Livingston v. Jefferson, iS Fed. Cas. 66o, 664 (No. 8411)
(C.C.D. Va. 1811).
The best definition is from a source which may not be regarded as primary
authority:
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history and forms of the common law, there are certain actions
which are safely brought only in a particular locality. These are
called local actions, and all others are transitory. It does not
follow, of course, that a transitory action is one that may be
brought anywhere. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, at least,
there are several concepts which limit the localities in which an
action may be brought: The court selected must have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or of some thing with
respect to which a claim is asserted; there must be compliance
with statutory venue provisions; and, even if these requirements
are met, the court in which the action is filed may decline to
adjudicate the case, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens 115 or one of a number of other doctrines ""I which have
no relation to the historical bases of the distinction between local
and transitory actions.
Under the early common law, all actions were local, being
triable only where it was possible to summon a jury having
knowledge of the facts." 7 Transitory actions are, therefore,
those which have somehow been freed from the localizing effect
of the common law's institutions, traditions, and forms. The remainder are local not because of inherent characteristics which
make them so in the nature of things, but simply because they
have not been so liberated. Lord Mansfield found a substantial
as well as a formal reason for treating certain actions as local:
In some actions, such as ejectment, the judgment could not be
There be actions local which must be tried,
Within the ward of Cheap to wit,
Where their proper cause doth of right abide,
And St. Mary-le-Bow to prosper it.
But trespass of transitory kind,
Within the ward of Cheap to wit,
Shall be laid where the plaintiff hath a mind,
And St. Mary-le-Bow to prosper it.
PoLuocK, LEADING CASES DONE INTo ENGLISH 22, 24 (2d ed. 1892).
"'See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See generally Blair,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLVM. L.
REv. 1 (1929).
1.6 For example, that the action is to recover a tax, or a penalty, or is contrary to the public policy of the forum. See generally RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
or LAWS §§ 6o8-6i7 (1934).
"'Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 66o, 663 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, 3 LAW: A CENTURY
or PROGESS 342, 345-49 (937); 5 HoLDswo R, HIsTORY Or ENGLISH LAw 11720, X40-42 (2d ed. T937).
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effectual if the action were not brought in a county in which the
officers of the court could execute it."" But even ejectment, the
most clearly local of all local actions, is not so in the nature of
things; given a change in the form of the judgment, or the authority of court officials, and in attitudes concerning what is convenient and appropriate in judicial administration, there is no
reason why an action of ejectment might not be brought in a
county or even a state other than that of the situs of the land." 9
Moreover, among the actions which have been liberated from the
conditions which once made them local, some are nevertheless
not freely triable in every court of competent jurisdiction because, as we have noted, other considerations of policy, or supposed policy, operate restrictively. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observed, discussing the development of the doctrine of locality in
England:
This however being not a statutory regulation, but a principle of
unwritten law, which is really human reason applied by courts,
not capriciously, but in a regular train of decisions, to human
affairs, according to the circumstances of the nation, the necessity
susof the times, and the general state of things, was thought
20
ceptible of modification - and judges have modified it.'

In short, it is not possible to tell whether an action, or cause of
action, is local or transitory merely by examination of it; it is
necessary to determine what considerations of legal policy limit
the freedom of the plaintiff to obtain trial in courts otherwise
competent. And, in modern times, the question is not simply
whether the action is local or transitory, but, more broadly:
Where may this action be brought?
The question may arise on the purely domestic level, as it did
in the first instance in England. On this level it is very likely to
be answered by statutory venue provisions, supplemented, perhaps, by the common-law distinction between local and transitory actions. It may also arise on the interstate (or international)
level, and here the problem becomes complex because the legal
policies of two or more states may be involved. Historically, the
8

1" Mostyn v. Fabrigas, i Cowp.

'774).
219

See i ANNuA.

16i, i76, 98

Eng. Rep. 1021, 1029-30 (K.B.

PRAcrIcE order 36, rule io (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
But cf. Arvid-

(1952); cf. Spencer v. Lapsley, 6i U.S. (20 How.) 264 (,857).

son v. Reynolds Metals Co., 1o7 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash. 1952).
120 Livingston v. Jefferson, iS Fed. Cas. 66o, 663 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 68 1959-1960

1959]

THE TRANSITORY CAUSE OF ACTION

question on the interstate level has been most frequently presented in terms of whether the court in which the action is
brought will or will not entertain it. It would seem appropriate
enough for the question thus presented to be determined by the
law of the forum,"' since, in the absence of a higher law, the
forum state is free to entertain a foreign cause of action or not
as its own convenience and other interests dictate (it being understood that such interests may counsel a due regard for feasibility
and for the legitimate concerns of other states). In fact, however,
few decisions since John Marshall's time exhibit his awareness
that the question is one of practical policy; most courts, at least
so far as their opinions disclose, have been content to determine
the question simply by inquiring whether the action is "local"
or "transitory" - thus assuming either that there is an inherent
difference between the two kinds of action or that the policy considerations which were pertinent in England in the eighteenth
century and earlier retain their validity for other times and
places.' 22
The exclusionary policies of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Ohio which
have been considered in Part II were, of course, efforts by forum
states to limit the mobility, or transitory character, of certain
causes of action. In effect, each of these states said: So far as
we are concerned, the actions in question are local; they will not
be entertained in this state. In two of the three instances, these
efforts were frustrated by the Supreme Court. We have now to
consider the relatively rare phenomenon of an attempt by a state
other than that of the forum to localize a cause of action. 3
121
122

Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63 (1849).
See Albert v. Fraser Cos., ii Mar. Prov. 209, ['9371 1 D.L.R. 39 (N.B.

1936); British South Africa Co. v. Conpanhia de Moqamibque, [1893] A.C. 602;
Willis, Jurisdiction of Courts- Action to Recover Damages for Injury to Foreign
Lands, x5 CAN. B. REV. 112 (1937); cf. Mannville Co. v. City of Worcester, 138
Mass. 89 (1884). There are occasional exceptions. Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952), 65 HARv. L. REv. 1242 (1952); Little
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N.W. 846 (1896). Similarly, a
few courts have broken sharply with other formulas for refusing to entertain foreign causes of action, such as that excluding actions for taxes due a foreign state.
City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (x957); State ex rel.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1zs, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946);
See Note, 7 NAT'L B.J. 354 (1949); RESTATEaENT, CoNLI Cr or LAWS § 61o
(Supp. X948).
121 The discussion will be limited principally to statutory attempts, since attempts to prevent the prosecution of an action in another state by injunction involve the problem of full faith and credit to judgments. See James v. Grand
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In 1903 the legislature of New Mexico, overriding the governor's veto, embarked upon an ambitious plan to localize all
causes of action for personal injury or wrongful death suffered
in the territory. The reason for the plan was candidly stated in
a preamble: It had become customary for such actions to be
brought in other states and territories, "to the increased cost and
annoyance and manifest injury and oppression of the business
interests of this territory and the derogation of the dignity of
the courts thereof." 124 The act provided that there should be
no civil liability under either the common law or any statute of
the territory for personal injury or death suffered therein unless,
inter alia, action should be filed within one year in a district
court of the territory. 125 This "condition precedent" was expressly made "a part of the law under which [a] right to recover
can exist for such injuries .... ,,126 The second section of the
act gave the initiative to the tortfeasor; he could summon the
aggrieved person into court, requiring him to file his complaint
then and there, and upon default could obtain an adjudication
on the issues of liability and damages. 1 27 Other sections provided
for expediting trial in New Mexico and for injunction where the
aggrieved party sued or threatened to sue elsewhere. 28 After
the passage of the act one Sowers, a resident of Arizona, was injured in New Mexico while employed as a brakeman by the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe - a Kansas corporation. He
brought his action in Texas and prevailed notwithstanding a
defense which set forth the localizing statute and invoked the
full-faith-and-credit clause. 2 9 The Supreme Court in Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers 130 affirmed, Mr. Justice Day writing for
the majority and Justices Holmes and McKenna dissenting. The
Trunk W.R.R., I4 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied, 358 U.S. gs (1958).
Despite the holding in Pere Marquette Ry. v. Slutz, 268 Mich. 388, 256 N.W.
458 (1934), the Michigan venue statute involved in the James case is not here
regarded as a statutory effort by the state of the transaction to impair the interstate mobility of the cause of action. See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 405, 425 ('955).
124N.M. Laws z9o3, ch. 33, at 51. The act was subsequently annulled by
Congress. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 63 (i909).
125 N.M. Laws 19o3, ch. 33, § i, at 5i.
"28 N.M. Laws 19o3, ch. 33, § i, at 52.
127 N.M. Laws I9o3, ch. 33, § 2, at 52.
128 N.M. Laws i9o3, ch. 33, §§ 3, 4, at 53.
o
121 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 99 S.W. 19 (Tex. Civ. App. z9o6).
12O 213 U.S. 55 (1909).
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opinion of the Court is a remarkable one. While recognizing indeed, while in one respect overstating -I- the federal obligation of Texas to give full faith and credit to the public acts of
New Mexico, the Court said simply, in effect: The rights of action
for personal injuries created by New Mexico law for personal injury and death are transitory and, while New Mexico has full
power to create and modify those rights, nothing it can do will
change their transitory character.' 32 If our brief review of the
distinction between local and transitory actions has served any
purpose, it must have demonstrated that whether or not an action
is transitory depends upon some particular body of law and legal
policy rather than upon any examination into the "nature" of
the cause of action. Upon what law did the Supreme Court rest
its determination that this cause of action for personal injuries
was transitory, so that it could be prosecuted in Texas? The
most charitable answer would be that it rested upon the law of
the forum. 133 As we have seen, it is not unreasonable for the

forum to look to its own law in such matters, in the absence
of higher law; but the Supreme Court was not sitting as a court
of the forum. It sat as a national court whose jurisdiction had
been invoked to resolve a conflict between the laws and policies
of two coordinate jurisdictions. 34 It is not enough to justify the
decision, therefore, that the Court applied the law of the forum.
On what basis did it make this choice of law, thereby subordinating the policy of New Mexico to that of Texas?
The least charitable answer would be that the Court was re1"1 Mr. Justice Day erroneously attributed to the Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122,

as amended, 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1952), a provision requiring that the public acts of a
state shall be given such faith and credit as they are entitled to in the state from
which they are taken. 213 U.S. at 64, 65. See Currie, The Constitution and the

Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. C3I. L.
Rxv. 9 (1958).
12 "An action for personal injuries is universally held to be transitory, and
maintainable wherever a court may be found that has jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter." 213 U.S. at 67.
S13"Each State may . . . determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its
courts, the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them, and specifically how far it will, having jurisdiction of the parties, entertain in its courts
transitory actions where the cause of action has arisen outside its borders.'" 213
U.S. at 7o, quoting from St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285
(igo8). (Author's omissions.)
34
The Act of 1804, 2 Stat. 298, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1952), was
properly relied on as placing the public acts of the territories on the same footing as
those of the states for purposes of full faith and credit. 213 U.S. at 64-65.
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lying on natural law: A transitory cause of action may be prosecuted anywhere, and anyone can examine this cause of action
and tell that it is transitory; its nature is such that it follows the
person of the defendant. A fairer answer would be that confronted with a delicate question involving the statecraft of federalism, without guidance from Congress, the Court did not rise
to the occasion but succumbed to the forces of inertia and resolved the question simply by reference to common-law precedents. Those precedents, based as they were on the efforts of
the English courts to work out a practical policy for their own
time and country, had little to offer by way of guidance to the
highest court in our modern federal system. Predominantly they
were concerned with determining the reaction of an English court
to actions based upon foreign events; '-r the distinctions between
local and transitory actions were worked out from the point of
view of the forum, so that from the moment the Court decided
to rely upon them a bias in favor of the forum state was injected
into the deliberations. Moreover, the circumstance that the foreign state had explicitly avowed a purpose to localize the action
was a novel one; and, in any event, the English courts had never
been called upon to consider, as a court in a federal system must
consider, the deference which may be owing as a matter of supreme law to the policy of the foreign state.
This relative abdication was prompted not only by a disinclination to venture upon the delicate task of formulating principles
of federalism but also by the Court's failure to distinguish between its function as arbiter of interstate conflicts and its function as exponent of a federal common law. "It is then the settled
law of this court," said Mr. Justice Day, "that in such . . .
actions the law of the place is to govern in enforcing the right
in another jurisdiction, but such actions may be sustained in other
jurisdictions when not inconsistent with any local policy of the
State wherein the suit is brought" 3 - citing a case in which
the Court had held that an action for the death of a person in
37
Maryland could be maintained in the District of Columbia.'
"35 See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHEL L.
REV. 405, 489--90 ('955); cf. McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (I How.) 241, 248-49
(1843). In a leading case, Turner, J., refused to enjoin prosecution of an action
abroad. Pennell v. Roy, 3 fle G.M. & G. 126, 43 Eng. Rep. 5o (CA. X853); cf.
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 1o7, 127(18go).
136 213 U.S. at 67-68. (Emphasis added.)
137 Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., z68 U.S. 445, 448 (1897).
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In that case, as also in the diversity case relied upon by the
Court, 3 " no constitutional question was presented. The Court
sat simply as the highest court of the forum, and enunciated the
policy which was to be binding upon lower courts of the forum
with respect to causes of action which were, with respect to
them, "foreign." The citation of such cases in support of a
formulation of "the settled law" of the Court is eloquent testimony that the Court was insufficiently sensitive to the distinctiveness of its role in a case involving the full-faith-and-credit
clause. 13 9
Substantially the same problem was presented to the Court
in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George.4 0 The Alabama
Employers' Liability Act 141 modified the common law of master
and servant relating to personal injuries, but the Alabama Code
provided that all actions under that act "must be brought in a
court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama, and
not elsewhere." 142 George, apparently a resident of Alabama,
was injured in the course of his employment in Alabama, and
brought his action by attachment against the employer- an
Alabama corporation- in Georgia. Notwithstanding a defense
invoking the restrictive provision of the Alabama Code and the
full-faith-and-credit clause, the Georgia courts gave judgment
for the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Counsel attempted to distinguish the Sowers case on the ground that there
common-law rights were involved, whereas here the right sued
upon was created by a statute which at the same time circumscribed the right.

4

The suggestion was brushed aside.

44

The

.38 Dennick v. Railroad Co., 1o3 U.S. ii (i88o).
1"9 For another instance of the same phenomenon, including the same unitary concept of the "law of this Court," see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown,
234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914), discussed in Currie, The Constitution and the Choice

of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cni. L. REv.
9, 69 (1958).
140 233 U.S. 354

(1914).

Ala. Civ. Code § 391o (1907), as amended, ALA. CODa tit. 26, § 326 (1940).
141 Ala. Civ. Code § 61i5 (1907). This provision was added to the Code after the
passage of the liability act, but was treated throughout as if it had been "part
and parcel of the statute creating the cause of action." Tennessee Coal, Iron
& R.R. Co. v. George, ii Ga. App. 221, 224, 75 S.E. 567, 568 (1912).
143 233 U.S. at 357.
145

4 "But that distinction marks no difference ...

common-law liability is statutory liability-

because in New Mexico,

the adopting statute . . .providing

that 'the common law as recognized in the United States of America shall be the
rule of practice and decision.'" 233 U.S. at 361. Furthermore, the Sowers deci-
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reasoning is much the same as that in Sowers, with the naturallaw flavor perhaps a bit more obtrusive:
a State cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the
same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of
action in any court having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to be
determined by the law of the court's creation and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute of another
State, even though it created the right of action.145
Conceivably, these two decisions may be read as having quite
limited significance. In one light, they hold no more than that a
state's decision to entertain a foreign cause of action, at least of
a type traditionally regarded as transitory, violates no constitutional principle despite statutory attempts by the state of the
transaction to localize the right of action. That was a proposition

fairly consistent with contemporary views as to the function of
the full-faith-and-credit clause. The effect of the clause with
respect to public acts of sister states was late in being recognized,
and even now has not been determined in anything like a definitive way.14 6 This view of the matter is reinforced by the fact
that, on a fair reading of these cases, the full faith and credit
which the Court conceded was required to the public acts of a
sister state was of a rather limited kind. One would hardly be warranted in inferring from either case that the state of the forum
sLion had not been based on the common-law character of the right asserted but
on the general principles relating to transitory actions. Ibid.
145 233 U.S. at 360. The circularity of the reference to "extraterritorial operation" is evident from the Court's immediately preceding statement that "the
courts of the sister State trying the case would be bound to give full faith and
credit to all those substantial provisions of the statute which inhered in the
cause of action or which name conditions on which the right to sue depend
[sic]." Ibid.
At one point, the Court seems to suggest that the action derived its interstate transitory character from the fact that it was transitory within Alabama.
233 U.S. at 359. Surely, however, it cannot be inferred that the result would have
been different if the statute had prescribed that suit be brought in a particular
county of Alabama. The New Mexico statute involved in Sowers had most particularly prescribed a local venue. N.M. Laws 19o3, ch. 33, § i,at 51. A slight suggestion of the notion of due process was introduced when the Court observed
that under -the restrictive provision the plaintiff might be deprived of a remedy
if the defendant should leave the state. 233 U.S. at 359. But the New Mexico
statute in Sowers was explicitly made inapplicable where the defendant could
not be validly served within the territory, N.M. Laws 19o3, ch. 33, § 5, at 54,
and this provision did not save the statute.
146 See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cr.L. Rav. 9 (1958).
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was required by the full-faith-and-credit clause to entertain the
cause of action; in its concessions concerning the effect of the
clause the Court seems to be saying no more than that, if the
forum elects to entertain the cause of action under foreign law,
it must respect the limitations and conditions imposed by the
foreign law, and, in particular, must not enlarge the obligation of
the defendant.

47

Although some language might support a con-

trary inference, 4 8 there was no holding that the localizing
statutes were void, but only that other states were not bound
to respect them.
Despite the element of reasonableness in this position, the two
cases cannot be so lightly and comfortably dismissed. The Supreme Court has now held, or apparently held, in the Hughes and
United Air Lines cases that the full-faith-and-credit clause compels the forum to entertain transitory causes of action asserted
under the laws of a sister state -at least causes of action for
wrongful death. This being so, we are left without a satisfactory
explanation of the paradox: full faith and credit to the public
acts of the sister state requires the forum to entertain an action
to enforce rights created by those acts, but does not require respect for other provisions of those acts - even, it seems, if they
are contained in the same statute -purporting
to confine the
right of action to the state of the transaction.
It is by no means enough to resolve this paradox to argue that
the "venue" of the action is "procedural," or relates to the
"remedy," and so is governed by the law of the forum. 149 In

order to approach a solution, it is necessary first of all to recall
that, as Part II was designed to demonstrate, the Supreme Court's
holdings in Hughes and United Air Lines do not by any means

go so far as has just been suggested. Those cases do not estab" See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 36o (1914) ;
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 67-70 (19o9); cf. Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, ix Ga. App. 221, 230, 75 S.E. 567, 571 (1912); Atchison,
T. &S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 99 S.W. 190, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o6).
148 "Of course, the Territory of New Mexico could pass no law having force
and effect over persons and property without its jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722; Story on the Conflict of Laws, § 539." Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 70 (T909). It should be observed here that a judgment
obtained by the putative tortfeasor under § 2 of the New Mexico statute is entitled to full faith and credit. Buttron v. El Paso N.E. Ry., 93 S.W. 676 (Tex.
Civ. App. x9o6).
" Cf. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359 (1914).
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lish that every transitory action, even for wrongful death, which
is predicated on the laws of a sister state must be entertained
by the forum. Those were cases in which the relationship of the
parties to the forum state was such that that state had an interest
in applying its policy with respect to wrongful death; in which
the withholding of a remedy amounted to an arbitrary discrimination by the forum state against a class of its own residents;
and in which the result could, and should, have been reached
without any reliance whatever on the full-faith-and-credit clause.
Does anyone really believe that those cases have abolished the
freedom of a state to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens
in what may be called the "pure" case for invocation of that doctrine, i.e., an action between nonresidents for personal injuries
inflicted elsewhere? 110 The Court has held no more than that
in certain circumstances a state may not close its doors to claims
based upon out-of-state transactions. What such circumstances
are, beyond those presented in the decided cases, is a question to
be answered with the aid of discriminating and realistic legal
analysis; the oversimplification that goes with easy generalization will not serve.
The answer to the problem posed by the Sowers and George
cases, like the answer to the problem posed by the Hughes and
United Air Lines cases, and also like the answer to the problem
of federal control of choice of law by state courts, is to be sought
through an analysis of the policies and interests of the states involved. The essential meaning of full faith and credit to public
acts is that each state must yield to every other the prerogative
of managing, its own concerns. The determination of what matters are within the legitimate concern of a state is realistically
made not by reference to territorialist dogma and common-law
precedent but by reference to the legal policies of the state and
the circumstances in which the execution of such policies is reasonable. 5 ' When it is plain that only one of the states associated
with a case has a legitimate interest in the application of its policy, the Constitution requires recognition of the law of that
state. When more than one state has a legitimate interest, a
problem is presented which cannot appropriately be resolved
15
152

See note

112

supra; cf. James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 IMI.2d 356, 362,

N.E.2d 858, 861-62, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915 (i958).
15 See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Govern-

mental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (i9g8).
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through the judicial process alone, but only by congressional action; and in the absence of congressional guidance the application of the law of any interested state should not be disturbed. 152
Assume that, other circumstances in Hughes v. Fetter being
the same, the Illinois wrongful-death statute had contained a
provision that the right of action thereby created could be enforced only in a court of competent jurisdiction in Illinois, and
not elsewhere. It is abundantly clear that the result which the
Court reached should not be affected in the slightest: Wisconsin
not only may, but must, entertain the plaintiff's claim for damages. This proposition is supportable simply on the basis of the
superficial holdings attributable to the cases: (i) that the fullfaith-and-credit clause requires a state to entertain a transitory
cause of action predicated on the law of a sister state if no plausible public policy can be adduced to support the refusal to do so;
and (2) that a state cannot create a "transitory" cause of action
and at the same time place limits upon its mobility. The proposition is more intelligibly supported by an analysis of the respective
interests of the states, such as was essayed in Part II. We have
already seen that Wisconsin had a policy with respect to wrongful death which, logically and impartially administered, should
have extended to the case at bar, and that the refusal so to extend
it was an arbitrary and capricious discrimination. The same
reasoning which underlies that conclusion leads also to the proposition that Wisconsin had an interest in providing a forum in
which the remedy could be pursued and that Illinois had no
interest in limiting the possible forums in such a way as to exclude Wisconsin. All the parties being domiciled and resident in
Wisconsin, that state had a clear interest in applying its basic
policy that local tortfeasors should pay compensation for the
deaths of looal victims, and an equally clear interest in providing
a forum at home for the enforcement of that policy. The only
conceivable policy which might be expressed in the hypothetical
effort by Illinois to localize the action would be one of making
work for the local bar. 5 3 That, however, is not a policy which
is likely to be explicitly avowed; it would have no relation to
15 2

Ibid.

" 3 This leaves out of account the possibility, as conceded in note 51 supra,
that Illinois might have a policy of deterring negligent conduct within the state
by imposing liability. At most, such a policy would justify Illinois in providing a
forum, and would not justify her attempt to exclude a Wison iln fonam,
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the governmental policies involved in the wrongful death statute;
and it ought to be regarded as a collateral, venal, and predatory
policy, entitled to no recognition for constitutional purposes. 5 4
On the other hand, consider the converse fact situation presented by James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. 5 Assuming that Michigan, the state in which the injury had occurred, in fact had a
statutory policy, as the Michigan court declared, of confining
the remedy to local courts, there is every reason why that policy
should be respected by Illinois since, as the home state of all the
parties, Michigan had a legitimate interest in the application of
its policy and Illinois had none whatever in the application of
its contrary policy, if any.-5 6 The policies conceivably attributable
to Illinois appear to be: (i) the overly generous one of making
Illinois justice available to all men everywhere and (2) the notto-be-avowed one of making the courts of Chicago a national
arena for the trial of personal-injury cases, to the delight and
profit of the local bar and its entourage. The second of these
should be ruled out on grounds which have already been suggested. The first is more subtle, since it suggests altruism and a
passionate desire to avoid discrimination and has an air, moreover, of concern for the administration of the local court system.
Apart from the fact that such a policy is in marked contrast to
that pursued by Illinois for half a century, of excluding such
actions even when the victims were citizens of Illinois, and also
to the concurrent Illinois policy of forum non conveniens, it
should be clear that the apparent justifications for such a policy
are spurious. The legitimate policies of a state concerning its
judicial system tend to protect the system against being overburdened or abused, and it would be difficult to make a plausible
case for the proposition that Illinois justice would be frustrated
if its courts were not operated as sanctuaries for forum-shoppers.
154

Cf. 38 Stat. x164, 1I65 (x915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 597

(1952);

Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (i92o); ZEIs, AiaPmcA SIPPING
PoLIcY 70 (1938). See also Nadelmann, Creditor Equality in Inter-State Bankruptcies: A Requisite of Uniformity in the Regulation of Bankruptcy, 98 U. PA.
L. P-v. 41 (1949).
15514 I1. 2d 356, X52 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915 (z958).
See
note 113 supra.
56
A fortiori, Illinois should have been required to respect the Michigan
judgment since, even if the court had erroneously calculated the interests involved, such error is of a type correctible only upon direct review. Cf. Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 3o8 U.S. 66 (1939). See generally Langmaid, The Full
Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts, 24 ILL. L. Rlv. 383 (1929).
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As for the avoidance of provincialism and discrimination, that is
a very laudable objective indeed; but there is a point at which
the desire to treat everyone alike, according to one's own standards, ceases to be laudable impartiality and becomes mere offi157
cious intermeddling with the concerns of others.
Admittedly, there is little in the cases on access to courts to
support this sort of analysis. Reason nevertheless demands that
one seek a defensible alternative to the course followed by the
Illinois Supreme Court when it enjoined enforcement of a judgment which would have interfered with the prosecution in Illinois of an action which in the normal course of events would
have been dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. 58 If we
turn to the two cases directly in point, we must conclude that the
decision in George was directly in conflict with the analysis here
suggested: So far as can be ascertained, all parties and events
were associated with Alabama, and Georgia had no interest whatever in burdening its courts with an attachment proceeding,
thereby interfering with the policy which Alabama had established for its own people. The case cannot be reconciled with
the thesis of this paper. It can, however, be criticized, as has
been suggested, on the ground that its rationale ignores the needs
of the federal system and concentrates instead upon common-law
precedents which are surely not decisive. Much the same must
be said of the Sowers case. Assuming that the Kansas railroad
corporation which was the defendant was one of those local
"business interests" for the protection of which the localizing
statute was enacted, all of the circumstances relevant in determining whether New Mexico had an interest in the application
of its policy would lead to an affirmative answer except one:
The injured plaintiff was a resident of Arizona. That circum-:
stance does not undermine New Mexico's interest: If the state
has an interest in protecting local enterprises against local resi157 Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), discussed in
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 38 (1958).
158 James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Ill.
2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 915 (i958). On a different level of legal analysis, an explanation of the
court's otherwise strange behavior might be found (i) in the fact that the
Michigan court's injunction, employed as a substitute for a plea of forum non
conveniens addressed to the Illinois court, had a provocative effect and (2) in
certain circumstances suggesting that the plaintiff's rights were unlikely to be
adequately protected in Michigan. See id. at 359-61, 152 N.E.2d at 86o-6i.
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dents, it has at least the same interest in protecting them against
nonresidents. But the circumstance does not support an interest
on the part of Texas. If Sowers had sued in his home territory,
Arizona might reasonably have asserted its own policy of providing a forum notwithstanding the contrary policy of the territory interested in the defendant. Texas, however, did not even
inquire what the policy of Arizona might be; it relied solely on
its own open-door policy - one which, in the circumstances, it
had no legitimate interest whatever in maintaining.
Although the Supreme Court has said nothing to support the
interest analysis in these cases, there are some indications in the
decisions* of the state courts of awareness that the problem is
one which ought to be approached in such terms. Thus Justice
Schaefer, while dissenting in the James case, emphasized that
"Illinois has no connection whatever with the occurrences out
of which the administrator's claim arose." 1'9 And the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals said in the Sowers case:
It may be that the lawmaking power of a state may have the
power to declare that there shall be no right of action for damages arising from personal injuries inflicted through the negligence of persons or corporations within its bounds, and, however
unjust and iniquitous such laws might be, they should be recognized and respected by the courts of other states. A state would
have the authority to pass laws compelling its injured citizens to
fully disclose their evidence and line of complaint to the negligent
party, and to give notice within a certain time of claims for damages, and sister states would recognize the validity of such laws.
The section of the law under consideration, however, goes farther
than the extreme measures indicated, and attempts not only to
prohibit its citizens, but all parties, who are so unfortunate as to
be injured within its territorial limits, from exercising the right,
accorded in England, the states of the American Union, and other
civilized countries, of instituting such actions wherever the guilty
party may have his or its domicile. 160
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Ill. 2d at 375,

152

N.E.2d at 868.

160 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 99 S.W. I9o, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. z9o6),

aff'd,

213 U.S. 55 (19o9).
(Emphasis added.) The fact that injunctions against
prosecuting civil actions outside the state are ordinarily directed only against local
residents is significant, as is also the fact that such injunctions are frequently associated with the desire of the local resident to gain advantage in some feature of the
law which will be applied by the foreign forum. See Currie, Change of Venue
and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. Rv. 405, 471-73, 486-87 (1955).
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If, as is almost certainly the case, the freedom of a state to employ the doctrine of forum non conveniens in a "pure" situation
has survived the decisions in Hughes and United Air Lines, it
must be because the forum state has no interest in entertaining
the action and, in fact, has a countervailing interest in protecting
its courts against the burdens and abuses entailed by such litigation. If this is recognized, it should not be difficult to recognize
a correlative interest, on the part of the state with which all the
parties and events are associated, in the application of its declared
policy of keeping such litigation at home. In other words, far
from having been rendered obsolete by the Hughes and United
Air Lines cases, the doctrine of forum non conveniens may now
be obligatory, at least where the state which is solely concerned
has enunciated a localizing policy.
Finally, we are now in position to respond to the doubt expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in
Sowers. Characteristically, this leading exponent of the obligatio
theory assumed that the law of the state of injury has both
power to give and power to take away, without regard to the
possible limitations of a federal constitution:
The Territory could have abolished the right of action altogether
if it had seen fit. It said by its statute that it would not do that,
but would adopt the common law liability on certain conditions
precedent, making them, however, absolute conditions to the right
to recover at all. One of those conditions was that the party should
sue in the Territory. Section i. A condition that goes to the right
conditions it everywhere. .

.

. [I] do not see why the condition

in §i was not valid and important. If it had been complied with
there might have been a different result.'"'
The answer is that while a state is free to determine for its own
domestic purposes in what circumstances liability will be imposed
for personal injuries, it does not have final authority, in this
federal system, to determine the effect in other states of the laws
which it enacts for that purpose. Under the full-faith-and-credit
U.S. at 71. Conceivably, Holmes may have meant that so long as the
plaintiff complied with the literal condition by filing suit in New Mexico within
the time specified, he could proceed to sue and recover in another state provided
the case in New Mexico did not go to judgment first. Such a reading of the
statute, however, would seem to be trifling with its clear purpose, declared in § 3,
to make suit outside the state "unlawful." N.M. Laws 1903, ch. 33, § 3, at 53.
See Davis, Where May the Injured Sue? 2 VA. L. REv. 33, 46-48 (914).
161
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clause the effect in one state of the public acts of another is a federal question. Congress is given explicit power to prescribe that
effect by general laws. In the absence of such congressional legislation the Court can function effectively to determine what effect
is appropriate where one state has an interest in the application
of its law and the other has none. It cannot function effectively
where the legitimate interests of two states are in conflict. But
in any event the determination of such effect is to be made by
federal authority and on federal principles. Clear recognition of
this fact would disembarrass the future development of the law
of two equally stultifying notions: that the matter is one to be
determined solely by the law of the forum, and that it is one to
be determined solely by the law of the place of injury. 162
(PartII of this article will be published in the December issue.)
162

In this connection it may be noted that the feckless attempt of the re-

visers of the Judicial Code in 1948 to have Congress exercise its powers under
the full-faith-and-credit clause with respect to public acts contributes nothing
to the solution of the problem under discussion. The implementing act, thanks to
the ingenuity of the revisers, provides: "Such Acts . . . shall have the same full
faith and credit .. . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such state
. . . from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952). If this means anything (which is doubtful, since the question of the effect in other states of the
localizing statute is not likely to arise in the courts of the enacting state, see
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 99 S.W. i9o, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o6), aff'd,
213 U.S. 55 (igog)), it produces the absurdity that each state must defer to
the law of the other. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
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